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1.INTRODUCTION 
 
As I read Ben Hamby’s piece, I found it hard to disagree with what he was saying. 
Certainly the willingness to inquire strikes me as extremely important. If that 
willingness was completely absent in someone, I find it hard to imagine how that 
person could amount to much as a critical thinker.  
Still, the pleasant complacency of collegial agreement is itself a cue that 
perhaps should trigger greater exertion to think critically. So I will adopt a 
deliberately oppositional stance, one that searches for flaws in the proposal that Ben 
is asking us to adopt. I will try to present a variety of provocations in this regard, 
and, if my efforts seem on occasion to be stretches, that’s OK so long as they 
stimulate further thinking—in this case further thinking about critical thinking and 
its pedagogy. 
 
2. THE SITUATIONIST CRITIQUE OF VIRTUE 
 
First, let me take direct aim at the general notion of virtue as an excellence of 
character. If one consults, for example, The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by 
John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group, one finds this assertion: 
“ much research in personality and social psychology appears to unsettle familiar 
notions of character . . .” (p. 355). John Doris sets the scene in his earlier book Lack 
of Character by describing virtues this way:  
 
As I put it, virtues are supposed to be robust traits. If a person has a robust trait, 
they can be confidently expected to display trait-relevant behavior across a wide 
variety of trait-relevant situations, even when some or all of these situations are not 
optimally conducive to such behavior. (p. 18) 
 
Obviously, if the notion of virtues is jeopardized, as Doris and his colleagues contend, 
by the fact that “social psychologists have repeatedly found that the difference 
between good conduct and bad appears to reside in the situation more that in the 
person” (Doris, 2010, p. 357), then, by extension, the idea that there are cognitive 
virtues is jeopardized at the same time. Thus, Doris cites a number of experimental 
manipulations that are the stock-in-trade of social psychologists, including the 
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famous experiments by Milgram and the so-called “Stanford prison experiment” by 
Zimbardo. Doris’s theme is the surprising power of what seem like incidental 
situational variables to alter the behavior of many subjects.  
What would this situationist perspective look like in relation to the 
propensity of someone to think engage in critical thinking? Here is a suggestion: 
consider the famous “framing effects” so artfully demonstrated in the work of Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, as for example in the “Asian Disease Problem” 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 368). Don’t their findings and the subsequent elaboration by 
many others show the importance of situational variables relating to how 
information is presented for whether or not a person successfully engages in 
rational thinking? I don’t mean to suggest that Ben is unaware of this challenge, but 
in treating it by addressing Missimer’s version of it, he runs the risk of 
underestimating how strong the challenge is to any approach to critical thinking 
that stresses the virtue(s) of the ideal critical thinker. It is not a challenge that is that 
easily dismissed. 
 
3. THE COGNTIVE MISER 
 
Next, there is the set of issues posed by the “cognitive miser” conception of human 
rationality. Keith Stanovich has done more than anyone else I know of to promote a 
vision of human rationality that emphasizes the effort required to think rationally. 
This effort is something we cognitive misers typically avoid, settling instead for “fast 
and frugal heuristics.” The distinction between the intuitive Type 1 processes and 
Type 2 processes is central to Stanovich’s work, and here is a statement from 
Stanovich and a colleague, Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, prefacing a recent defense of the 
distinction: 
 
Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes 
(Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive 
higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 
2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory. 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 223) 
 
From this perspective, none of us are likely to be critical thinkers, coolly and 
deliberately evaluating evidence and arguments, during most of the course of our 
lives. So perhaps the issue to be dealt with is how to make it more likely that people 
will deploy their critical thinking skills in a greater array of circumstances. I suspect 
there may very well be a host of factors relevant to making this effort that are 
discoverable by psychological research. For example, the work of Carol Dweck has 
emphasized that a child’s theory of intelligence has a profound effect on his or her 
willingness to risk failure. The belief that intelligence is a fixed quantity leads to “an 
urgency to prove yourself over and over” (Dweck, p. 6), and instead of using failure 
as an opportunity to learn, failure becomes something to avoid because it leads to 
deflating conclusions about oneself: “I’m an idiot.”  
So why should many of our students, people who have this firm belief in the 
fixity of intelligence, go to the extensive efforts required, for example, to really learn 
the basics of statistical thinking or an informed appreciation for carefully designed 
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experiments? (For an interesting take on a brief test that may signal greater 
willingness to put in the necessary effort see Toplak et al. (2011) on the Cognitive 
Reflection Test.) 
 
4. MOTIVATION  
 
When one considers the phrase “the willingness to inquire” it involves, in Ben’s 
words, “the internal motivation to carefully examine an issue in an effort to reach a 
reasoned judgment.” So the question becomes how to enhance people’s motivation 
to engage in critical thinking. As someone who has for many years taught a critical 
thinking course, I did not totally ignore this dimension of the undertaking—on the 
first day of class I would emphasize that the person whose beliefs you should 
scrutinize the most carefully is yourself because those beliefs make the most 
difference as far as your life going well or going badly, and that those beliefs whose 
truth or falsity matters the most to you should receive an especially careful review. 
Plus, I’d emphasize the usual traps for the unwary in advertising and political 
campaigns, giving students an assignment that sent them to FactCheck.org during 
the 2008 election season, for example. But I did not give systematic attention to the 
question of motivation. Of course, a number of students responded positively when 
introduced to fallacies such as straw man, ad hominem, begging the question, false 
dilemma, etc. They zealously accepted the opportunity to bring in examples of these 
fallacies culled from TV, the local newspapers, or the arguments of roommates and 
family members. But for many, I’m afraid, it all was just one more hoop to jump 
through.  
The best serious and systematic efforts to address the “motivation gap” that I 
am aware of occur right on my home campus in the form introductory sciences 
classes conducted under the heading “Foundations of Science.” These are optional 
classes for nonscience majors, and they are taught principally through the use of 
vivid case studies, for example a dramatic case involving the scare over the alleged 
link between vaccination and autism. My two colleagues who are most deeply 
involved in this enterprise, Matt Rowe, a biologist, and Marcus Gillespie, a 
geographer, created and adapted case studies that allow students to get involved in 
group discussions about what the best conclusions will be, given the data, and to 
experience the power of applying the logic of experimental design to the questions 
raised in the cases. Marcus and Matt have been able to systematically assess the 
impact of this approach on students’ critical thinking abilities, and the impact is 
pronounced. And I can testify from personal experience (to be sure a sample size of 
one) about the impact of the case studies by having participated with other faculty 
members as learners in a teaching workshop demonstration of the method.  
In any event, most of us who teach critical thinking can and should give 
careful thought about motivating our students, and we should give attention to 
whatever lessons we can learn from relevant research. By focusing on the 
willingness to inquire, Ben highlights the centrality of motivation, and that, it seems 
to me, is a good thing. 
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5. THE TRANSFER ISSUE 
 
Part of the point of talking about virtues of any sort, including cognitive virtues, is, I 
suppose, the idea that a person will exhibit the appropriate behavior in a wide 
variety of situations. Thus, my former student, Morgan Luttrell, who along with his 
identical twin brother Marcus, became a Navy SEAL can be relied upon to keep his 
cool in all sorts of extremely dangerous situations that would probably leave me 
simply paralyzed or running rather rapidly toward what I hope will be an escape. 
But the ability to control one’s reactions to fear is of little value if one is unable to 
recognize the danger in situations when it arises. A large part of Morgan’s training 
then, was not about staying steady in the face of danger, so much as it was about 
being able to size up situations quickly and correctly as far as the threat or lack of it 
they pose. If it’s not too much of a stretch, an analogous issue with any critical 
thinking virtue is the issue of “transference,” that is being keen at recognizing 
situations as ones that call for the deployment of specific critical thinking skills.  
Thus Diane Halpern, former President of the American Psychological 
Association and author of a critical thinking textbook (soon to appear in its fifth 
edition) has a four-part model for teaching thinking skills that includes: (a) 
dispositions, (b) skills, (c) metacognition, and (d) structure-training activities. These 
last activities are crucial for transfer, and Halpern avers that  
 
On the basis of what is already known about adults’ learning, students need spaced 
practice with different sorts of examples and corrective feedback to develop the 
habit of “spontaneous noticing.” Learning should be arranged to facilitate retrieval 
of skills in a way that does not depend on content area. (Halpern, 1998, p. 453) 
 
Her example is teaching students to recognize the existence of “sunk costs” in a 
number of disparate circumstances, but my own examples come from recalling the 
students who began to notice fallacies everywhere--once they caught on to them. 
The students began to pay attention the swirl of argumentation in the persuasive 
communications that surround us daily. Ad hominem, illegitimate appeal to 
authority, and inferring causation from correlation began to leap out at them. And of 
course students need practice with these matters that is not limited to a stand-alone 
critical thinking class, but to some degree, at least, practice which pervades their 
entire course of study. 
 
6. A QUESTION ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE VIRTUE  
 
But let me return to the idea of a cardinal critical thinking virtue, the willingness to 
inquire, understood, as Ben suggests, as “the internal motivation to carefully 
examine an issue in an effort to reach a reasoned judgment.” Here is a question: is 
this virtue like the theological virtues—faith, hope, and love? Or is the virtue like 
those in Aristotle’s account? The issue that I wonder about comes to this—while one 
can certainly have too little faith, too little hope, and too little love, it is harder to see 
how these could be excessive—at least that is my impression of how the medievals 
viewed them—there is no upper limit. In contrast, of course, Aristotle (and most of 
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us) will allow that for qualities of character such as courage, temperance, 
truthfulness, and the like there can be defects of too little and defects of too much. 
So with regard to the virtue of the willingness to inquire—we are all familiar with 
the defect of too little, but is there a defect of too much? I suspect there is. Let me 
use my daughter Joanna as an example. She is a very bright, very conscientious 
person who is chief of Nuclear Medicine at the University of New Mexico. She told 
me a few years ago about happening to hear a program on NPR while she was 
driving to work, a program that discussed the contrast between optimizing and 
satisficing. She suddenly had a start of recognition when she realized that she 
generally operated as an optimizer, and it was actually something of a relief to her to 
understand now that for many of us in most situations the “good enough” of 
satisficing is, well, good enough. 
Here is the issue that presents itself under this heading, namely, how does 
one recognize when someone is putting in the requisite amount of effort to 
“carefully examine an issue”? What appears to be a slapdash, off-the-cuff response 
may just be the quite reasonable strategy of satisficing. Or forget about determining 
whether the behavior of others exhibits the virtue, what about one’s own behavior? 
Is there a bright line standard for when one should exert oneself to the fullest in an 
“effort to reach a reasoned judgment” versus those times when one can rest content 
with a casual survey of the situation? If there is no such bright line standard, what 
then is the basis for our assessment? 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
In closing, let me thank Ben for presenting all of us with an occasion to think 
critically about critical thinking. The root question he addresses concerns the ideals 
we set for ourselves and for those whom we model for and preach to. It behooves us 
to give them careful consideration. 
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